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INTRODUCTION 
SENTENCING 
Judge Maxine Chesney, San Francisco 
Superior Court (Juvenile Division), San 
Francisco, California 
Judge Lois G. Forer, Court of Common 
Pleas, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
Judge Joseph Mattina, Surrogate's 
Court, Buffalo, New York 
Judge Michael Greer, San Diego Supe-
rior Court, San Diego, California 
Of all the decisions facing trial judges, those surrounding 
sentencing are the most difficult. Public opinion focuses on the 
sentencing of criminal defendants-particularly those defen-
dants whose trials have received media attention-and public 
outrage results from what is perceived as a "light" sentence. 1 
Judges are called upon to be "tougher" on criminals, and women 
judges in particular are perceived as being too lenient. The 
NA W J, in recognition of the difficulty faced by all judges in the 
area of sentencing, presented the panel on Sentencing to share 
and discuss viewpoints on this issue. 
The panel included Judge Lois G. Forer of Pennsylvania, 
who has been on the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia 
since 1971 and is the author of Criminals and Victims;2 Judge 
Joseph Mattina of the Surrogate's Court of Buffalo, New York, 
who has lectured at the National Judicial College in Reno, Ne-
vada on sentencing theory, philosophy, and practice; and Judge 
Michael Greer, who has been a superior court judge in San Di-
ego, California since 1977 and has published a compendium of 
felony sentencing laws in California.3 
The topic of sentencing has many different aspects, and the 
panelists acknowledged this fact. The panel discussion, however, 
focused on what was perceived currently as the most important 
issue in the sentencing area-the rise of mandatory sentencing 
1. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 8, 1983, at 32, col. 4. 
2. L. FORER, CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS (1980) 
3. M. GREER & B. ROSEN, THE FELONY SENTENCING MANUAL (1982), 
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and concurrent limitations imposed on the use of judicial discre-
tion. All the panelists agreed that sentencing is a complicated 
and difficult process and stressed the need therefore to use dis-
cretion in sentencing. The use of alternative sentencing options 
was also advocated, and each of the panelists added her/his own 
perspectives on this issue. 
MANDATORY SENTENCING VERSUS JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Mandatory Sentencing 
Judge Greer described an example of a mandatory sentenc-
ing scheme-California's Violent Sex Crimes Act.' In California, 
prior to 1978, Penal Code section 6545 stated in part: "An act or 
omission which is made punishable in different ways by different 
provisions of [the Penal] Code may be punished under either of 
such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more 
than one .... " According to Judge Greer, under Penal Code 
section 654 multiple sex crimes committed by a defendant could 
only be punished as one crime. Appellate courts held that al-
though a defendant committed a number of sexual assaults or 
crimes, there was only one intent-sexual gratification. In 1979, 
the California Supreme Court in People u. Perez6 stated it was 
well settled that Penal Code section 654 applied "not only where 
there was but one act in the ordinary sense, but also where there 
was a course of conduct which violated more than one statute 
but nevertheless constituted an indivisible transaction."7 The 
court, in determining the applicability of the section to sex of-
fenses, focused on whether a defendant should be deemed to 
have entertained single or multiple objectives. The court held 
that the general intent or objective to obtain sexual gratification 
was too broad to invoke Penal Code Section 654, and that each 
4. 1979 Cal. Stat. 944. Chapter 944 increased the determinate sentences and possible 
enhancement sentences for certain sex crimes and the penalties for solicitation to com-
mit these crimes; it altered probation status related to these crimes and provided new 
procedures for the registration of persons convicted of certain sex crimes. For a discus-
sion of the legislation, see Selected 1979 Cal. Legislation, 11 PACIFIC L.J. 429 (1979). 
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1970). 
6. 23 Cal. 3d 545, 591 P.2d 63, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1979). 
7. 23 Cal. 3d at 551, 591 P.2d at 67, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 43. 
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separate criminal sex act could be punished.8 The Perez deci-
sion, according to Judge Greer, permitted trial judges to punish 
separate criminal sex acts and was the precursor of the Violent 
Sex Crimes Act. 
The Act added a sentencing statute for sex offenses-Penal 
Code section 667.6-which provides a five-year enhancement for 
offenders who have previously been convicted of a violent sex 
offense and permits the imposition of a full, separate, and con-
secutive term for each violent sex offense "whether or not the 
crimes were committed during a single transaction."9 A defen-
8. [d. at 552-53, 591 P.2d at 68, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 44. 
9. CAL. PENAL CODE 2 § 667.6 provides: 
(a) Any person who is found guilty of violating subdivi-
sion (2) or (3) of Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of 
Section 288, Section 289, or of committing sodomy or oral cop-
ulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence, 
duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm who has been 
convicted previously of any such offense shall receive a five-
year enhancement for each such prior conviction provided that 
no enhancement shall be imposed under this subdivision for 
any conviction occurring prior to a period of 10 years in which 
the person remained free of both prison custody and the com-
mission of an offense which results in a felony conviction. 
(b) Any person convicted of an offense specified in subdi-
vision (1) who has served two or more prior prison terms as 
defined in Section 667.5 or any offense specified in subdivision 
(a), shall receive a 10-year enhancement for each such prior 
term provided that no additional enhancement shall be im-
posed under this subdivision for any prison term served prior 
to a period of 10 years in which the person remained free of 
both prison custody and the commission of an offense which 
results in a felony conviction. 
(c) In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, 
separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each viola-
tion of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261, Section 264.1, 
subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 289, or of committing 
sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a 
by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily 
harm whether or not the crimes were committed during a sin-
gle transaction. If such term is imposed consecutively pursu-
ant to this subdivision, it shall be served consecutively to any 
other term of imprisonment, and shall commence from the 
time such person would otherwise have been released from im-
prisonment. Such term shall not be included in any determi-
nation pursuant to Section 1170.1. Any other term imposed 
subsequent to such term shall not be merged therein but shall 
commence at the time such person would otherwise have been 
released from prison. 
(d) A full, separate, and consecutive term shall be served 
3
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dant's objective in committing the offenses is now irrelevant. 
Enhancements are mandatory under Penal Code section 667.6; 
imposition of a full, separate, and consecutive term is not 
mandatory. 10 
Judge Greer stated that the sentencing scheme for violent 
sex offenders has been effective in California. He felt that the 
mandatory sentencing aspect of the scheme acts as a deterrent 
to violent sex offenders-they know they will be sentenced to 
long prison terms. However, he acknowledged that the effective-
ness of the scheme is also due to increased prosecutor awareness 
of sex crimes, a change in California's evidence code to exclude 
evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct, and an increased sen-
sitivity to the plight of victims. 
Judge Greer also noted the danger of enacting a mandatory 
sentencing scheme in one area of the law. He stated that the 
body of law developed to deal with violent sex crimes, such as 
the admission of evidence of similar acts, can and is being used 
for other crimes. 
Judicial Discretion 
Judge Forer warned that since 1970 every state has passed 
either mandatory or determinate sentencing provisions. She 
stated that the movement to mandatory sentencing was the re-
sult of criminologists' perceived failure of rehabilitation. Impos-
10. [d. 
for each violation of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261, Sec-
tion 264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 289, or of 
committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 
286 or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of 
great bodily harm if such crimes involve separate victim or in-
volve the same victim on separate occasions. 
Such term shall be served consecutively to any other term 
of imprisonment, and shall commence from the time such per-
son would otherwise have been released from imprisonment. 
Such term shall not be included in any determination pursu-
ant to Section 1170.1. Any other term imposed subsequent to 
such term shall not be merged therein but shall commence at 
the time such person would otherwise have been released from 
prison. 
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ing mandatory sentences and limiting judicial discretion in sen-
tencing is viewed by critics as a solution to individualized 
justice. Mandatory sentencing schemes reduce a judge's ability 
to consider an individual defendant's circumstances. It prevents 
a judge from taking into account various factors and considera-
tions when imposing a sentence, such as the dangerousness of 
the defendant, the magnitude of the offense, and the victim of 
the offense. 
Mandatory sentencing treats all criminals in the same way; 
it ignores the differences in crimes and in offenders. According 
to both Judge Forer and Judge Mattina, a judge needs to be able 
to consider the totality of the circumstances when sentencing a 
defendant. A multitude of factors can and should be considered 
before imposing a sentence-e.g., the age of the defendant; the 
victim of the crime; the effect of the punishment; the conditions 
in prisons; the difference in the nature of crimes committed by 
women; the economic impact on a family of jailing its sole sup-
port. A judge should have the discretion to consider these fac-
tors and to consider alternatives to prison. Judicial discretion in 
sentencing permits a judge to consider imposing fines, ordering 
restitution and reparation, ordering community service or enroll-
ment in a school program. Judge Mattina noted that discretion 
permits a judge to use creative approaches to sentencing, espe-
cially with first-time offenders. 
The panelists acknowledged that a scheme such as the Vio-
lent Sex Crimes Act can have a positive impact, but Judge Forer 
noted: 
What we are doing [with mandatory sentencing] 
is taking discretion away from the judges and 
placing it on the district attorney. The district at-
torney will decide what charges to proceed on: 
whether they shall be charges that require a 
mandatory sentencing or not. We have removed 
discretion from the judge where it belongs. . . in 
the open court, and put it behind closed doors in 
the prosecutor's office. 
5
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CONCLUSION 
Although sentencing a defendant is the most difficult task a 
judge faces, mandatory sentencing should not relieve judges 
from this task. Sentencing schemes such as the Violent Sex 
Crimes Act can be applauded, but mandatory sentencing cannot 
be used for every crime .• Tudges are challenged to be consistent, 
fair, and creative under a discretionary sentencing system, and 
all panelists agreed that judges should be permitted to meet this 
challenge. 
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